RATS Conceptual Messages Wrapper (CMW)

3.1. Record CMW

The format of the Record CMW is shown in Figure 1. The JSON [STD90] and CBOR [STD94] representations are provided separately. Both the json-record and cbor-record have the same fields except for slight differences in the types discussed below.¶

json-record = [
  type: media-type
  value: base64url-string
  ? ind: uint .bits cm-type
]

cbor-record = [
  type: coap-content-format-type / media-type
  value: bytes
  ? ind: uint .bits cm-type
]

Each contains two or three members:¶

type:

Either a text string representing a Content-Type (e.g., an EAT media type [I-D.ietf-rats-eat-media-type]) or an unsigned integer corresponding to a CoAP Content-Format ID (Section 12.3 of [RFC7252]). The latter MUST NOT be used in the JSON serialization.¶

value:

The RATS conceptual message serialized according to the value defined in the type member. When using JSON, the value field MUST be encoded as Base64 using the URL and filename safe alphabet (Section 5 of [RFC4648]) without padding. This always applies, even if the conceptual message format is already textual (e.g., a JWT EAT). When using CBOR, the value field MUST be encoded as a CBOR byte string.¶

ind:

An optional bitmap that indicates which conceptual message types are carried in the value field. Any combination (i.e., any value between 1 and 15, included) is allowed. This is useful only if the type is potentially ambiguous and there is no further context available to the CMW consumer to decide. For example, this might be the case if the base media type is not profiled (e.g., application/eat+cwt), if the value field contains multiple conceptual messages with different types (e.g., both Reference Values and Endorsements within the same application/signed-corim+cbor), or if the same profile identifier is shared by different conceptual messages. Future specifications may add new values to the ind field; see Section 9.5.¶

3.2. Tag CMW

Tag CMWs derive their tag numbers from a corresponding CoAP Content-Format ID using the TN() transform defined in Appendix B of [RFC9277]. Such CBOR tag numbers are in range [1668546817, 1668612095].¶

The RATS conceptual message is first serialized according to the Content-Format ID and then encoded as a CBOR byte string, to which the TN-derived tag number is prepended.¶

The Tag CMW is defined in Figure 2 using two different macros. One for CBOR-encoded types, the other for all other types. Both macros take the CBOR tag number tn as a parameter. The tag-cm-cbor macro takes the CDDL definition of the associated conceptual message fmt as a second parameter.¶

tag-cm-cbor<tn, fmt> = #6.<tn>(bytes .cbor fmt)

tag-cm-data<tn> = #6.<tn>(bytes)

To add a new CMW, the $cbor-tag type socket is extended with a new instance of the Tag CMW macro. For example, to associate conceptual messages of type my-evidence with CBOR tag 1668576819, one would extend $cbor-tag as follows:¶

$cbor-tag /= tag-cm-cbor<1668576819, my-evidence>

my-evidence = {
  &(eat_nonce: 10) => bstr .size (8..64)
}

3.3. Collection CMW

Layered Attesters and composite devices (Sections 3.2 and 3.3 of [RFC9334]) generate Evidence that consists of multiple parts. For example, in data center servers, it is not uncommon for separate attesting environments (AE) to serve a subsection of the entire machine. One AE might measure and attest to what was booted on the main CPU, while another AE might measure and attest to what was booted on a SmartNIC plugged into a PCIe slot, and a third AE might measure and attest to what was booted on the machine's GPU. To allow aggregation of multiple, potentially non-homogeneous evidence formats collected from different AEs, this document defines a Collection CMW as a container that holds several CMW items, each with a label that is unique within the scope of the Collection.¶

Although originally designed to support layered Attester and composite device use cases, the Collection CMW can be adapted for other scenarios that require the aggregation of RATS conceptual messages. For instance, Collections may be used to group Endorsements, Reference Values, Attestation Results, and more. A single Collection CMW can contain a mix of different message types, and it can also be used to carry messages related to multiple devices simultaneously.¶

The Collection CMW (Figure 3) is defined as a CBOR map or JSON object containing CMW values. The position of a cmw entry in the cmw-collection is not significant. Labels can be strings (or integers in the CBOR serialization) that serve as a mnemonic for different conceptual messages in the Collection.¶

A Collection MUST have at least one CMW entry.¶

The "__cmwc_t" key is reserved for associating an optional type to the overall Collection and MUST NOT be used for a label. The value of the "__cmwc_t" key is either a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) or an object identifier (OID). The OID is always absolute and never relative. The URI is always in the absolute form (Section 4.3 of [RFC3986]).¶

Since the Collection CMW is recursive (a Collection CMW is itself a CMW), implementations may limit the allowed depth of nesting.¶

json-collection = {
  ? "__cmwc_t": ~uri / oid
  + &(label: text) => json-cmw
}

cbor-collection = {
  ? "__cmwc_t": ~uri / oid
  + &(label: (int / text)) => cbor-cmw
}

3.4. Decapsulation Algorithm

Once any external framing is removed (for example, if the CMW is carried in a certificate extension), the CMW decoder performs a 1-byte lookahead to determine how to decode the remaining byte buffer. The following pseudo-code illustrates this process:¶

func CMWTypeDemux(b []byte) (CMW, error) {
  if len(b) == 0 {
    return Unknown
  }

  if b[0] == 0x82 || b[0] == 0x83 {
    return CBORRecord
  } else if b[0] == 0xda {
    return CBORTag
  } else if b[0] == 0x5b {
    return JSONRecord
  } else if b[0] == 0x7b {
    return JSONCollection
  } else if (b[0] >= 0xa0 && b[0] <= 0xbb) || b[0] == 0xbf {
    return CBORCollection
  }

  return Unknown
}

4.1. Signing CBOR CMW using COSE Sign1

A CBOR CMW can be signed using COSE [STD96]. A signed-cbor-cmw is a COSE_Sign1 with the following layout:¶

signed-cbor-cmw = [
  protected: bytes .cbor signed-cbor-cmw-protected-hdr
  unprotected: signed-cbor-cmw-unprotected-hdr
  payload: bytes .cbor cbor-cmw
  signature: bytes
]

The payload MUST be the CBOR-encoded Tag, Record or Collection CMW.¶

signed-cbor-cmw-protected-hdr = {
  1 => int                    ; alg
  2 => "application/cmw+cbor" ; cty
  * cose.label => cose.values
}

signed-cbor-cmw-unprotected-hdr = {
  * cose.label => cose.values
}

cose.label = int / text
cose.values = any

The protected header MUST include the signature algorithm identifier. The protected header MUST include the content type application/cmw+cbor. Other header parameters MAY be added to the header buckets, for example a kid that identifies the signing key.¶

4.2. Signing JSON CMW using JWS

A JSON CMW can be signed using JSON Web Signature (JWS) [RFC7515]. A signed-json-cmw is a JWS object with the following layout:¶

signed-json-cmw = {
  "protected": text .b64u (text .json signed-json-cmw-protected-hdr)
  ? "header": text .b64u (text .json signed-json-cmw-unprotected-hdr)
  "payload": text .b64u (text .json json-cmw)
  "signature": text .b64u bytes
}

The payload MUST be the JSON-encoded Record or Collection CMW.¶

signed-json-cmw-protected-hdr = {
  "alg": text
  "cty": "application/cmw+json"
  * text => text
}

signed-json-cmw-unprotected-hdr = {
  * text => text
}

The protected header MUST include the signature algorithm identifier. The protected header MUST include the content type application/cmw+json. Other header parameters MAY be added to the header buckets, for example a kid that identifies the signing key.¶

For clarity, the above uses the Flattened JSON Serialization (Section 7.2.2 of [RFC7515]). However, the Compact Serialization (Section 3.1 of [RFC7515]) can also be used.¶

4.3. Transporting CMW in COSE and JOSE Web Tokens

To facilitate the embedding of CMWs in CBOR-based protocols and web APIs, this document defines two "cmw" claims for use with JSON Web Tokens (JWT) and CBOR Web Tokens (CWT).¶

The definitions for these claims can be found in Section 9.2 and Section 9.1, respectively.¶

4.4. Transporting CMW in X.509 Messages

CMW may need to be transported in PKIX messages, such as Certificate Signing Requests (CSRs) or in X.509 Certificates and Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs).¶

The use of CMW in CSRs is documented in [I-D.ietf-lamps-csr-attestation], while its application in X.509 Certificates and CRLs is detailed in Section 6.1 of [DICE-arch].¶

This section outlines the CMW extension designed to carry CMW objects.¶

The CMW extension MAY be included in X.509 Certificates, CRLs [RFC5280], and CSRs.¶

The CMW extension MUST be identified by the following object identifier:¶

id-pe-cmw  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
        { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
          security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-pe(1) TBD }

This extension SHOULD NOT be marked critical. It MAY be marked critical in cases where the attestation-related information is essential for granting resource access, and there is a risk that legacy relying parties would bypass such controls.¶

The CMW extension MUST have the following syntax:¶

CMW ::= CHOICE {
    json UTF8String,
    cbor OCTET STRING
}

The CMW MUST include the serialized CMW object in either JSON or CBOR format, utilizing the appropriate CHOICE entry.¶

The DER-encoded CMW is the value of the OCTET STRING for the extnValue field of the extension.¶

CMWExtn
  { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
    security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
    id-mod-cmw-collection-extn(TBD) }

DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN

IMPORTS
  EXTENSION
  FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009  -- RFC 5912
    { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
      security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
      id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57) } ;

-- CMW Extension

ext-CMW EXTENSION ::= {
  SYNTAX CMW
  IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-cmw }

-- CMW Extension OID

id-pe-cmw  OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=
   { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
     security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-pe(1) TBD }

-- CMW Extension Syntax

CMW ::= CHOICE {
    json UTF8String,
    cbor OCTET STRING
}

END

5.1. JSON-encoded Record

[
  "application/vnd.example.rats-conceptual-msg",
  "I0faVQ"
]

5.2. CBOR-encoded Record

[
  30001,
  h'2347da55'
]

with the following wire representation:¶

82             # array(2)
   19 7531     # unsigned(30001)
   44          # bytes(4)
      2347da55 # "#G\xDAU"

Note that a Media-Type-Name can also be used with the CBOR-encoded Record form, for example if it is known that the receiver cannot handle CoAP Content-Formats, or (unlike the case in point) if a CoAP Content-Format ID has not been registrered.¶

[
  "application/vnd.example.rats-conceptual-msg",
  h'2347da55'
]

5.3. CBOR-encoded Tag CMW

1668576935(h'2347da55')

with the following wire representation:¶

da 637476a7    # tag(1668576935)
   44          # bytes(4)
      2347da55 # "#G\xDAU"

5.4. CBOR-encoded Record with explicit CM indicator

This is an example of a signed CoRIM (Concise Reference Integrity Manifest) [I-D.ietf-rats-corim] with an explicit ind value of 0b0000_0011 (3), indicating that the wrapped message contains both Reference Values and Endorsements.¶

[
  "application/signed-corim+cbor",
  h'd901f6d28440a044d901f5a040',
  3
]

with the following wire representation:¶

83                                      # array(3)
   78 1d                                # text(29)
      6170706c69636174696f6e2f7369676e65642d636f72696d2b63626f72 # "app
lication/signed-corim+cbor"
   4d                                   # bytes(13)
      d901f6d28440a044d901f5a040        # "\xD9\u0001\xF6҄@\xA0D\xD9\u00
01\xF5\xA0@"
   03                                   # unsigned(3)

5.5. CBOR-encoded Collection

The following example is a CBOR-encoded Collection CMW that assembles conceptual messages from three attesters: Evidence for attesters A and B and Attestation Results for attester C. It is given an explicit "__cmwc_t" using the URI form.¶

{
  "__cmwc_t": "tag:example.com,2024:composite-attester",
  / attester A / 0: [
    30001,
    h'2347da55',
    4
  ],
  / attester B / 1: 1668576935(h'2347da55'),
  / attester C / 2: [
    "application/eat+jwt",
    h'2e2e2e',
    8
  ]
}

5.6. JSON-encoded Collection

The following example is a JSON-encoded Collection CMW that assembles Evidence from two attesters.¶

{
  "__cmwc_t": "tag:example.com,2024:another-composite-attester",
  "attester A": [
    "application/eat-ucs+json",
    "e30K",
    4
  ],
  "attester B": [
    "application/eat-ucs+cbor",
    "oA",
    4
  ]
}

5.7. Use in JWT

The following example shows the use of the "cmw" JWT claim to transport a Collection CMW in a JWT Claims Set [RFC7519]:¶

{
  "cmw": {
    "__cmwc_t": "tag:example.com,2024:another-composite-attester",
    "attester A": [
      "application/eat-ucs+json",
      "e30K",
      4
    ],
    "attester B": [
      "application/eat-ucs+cbor",
      "oA",
      4
    ]
  },
  "iss": "evidence collection daemon",
  "exp": 1300819380
}

7.1. Project Veraison

The organization responsible for this implementation is Project Veraison, a Linux Foundation project hosted at the Confidential Computing Consortium.¶

The software, hosted at https://github.com/veraison/cmw, provides a Golang package that allows encoding and decoding of CMW payloads. The implementation covers all the features presented in this draft. The maturity level is alpha. The license is Apache 2.0. The developers can be contacted on the Zulip channel: https://veraison.zulipchat.com/#narrow/stream/383526-CMW/.¶

8.1. CMW Protection

CMW itself does not provide any mechanisms for authenticity, integrity protection, or confidentiality. It is the responsibility of the designer for each use case to determine the necessary security properties and implement them accordingly. In some scenarios, a secure channel (e.g., via TLS) or object-level security (e.g., using JWT) may be sufficient, but this is not always the case.¶

When a CMW is used to carry Evidence for composite or layered attestation of a single device, all components within the CMW must be cryptographically bound to prevent an attacker from replacing Evidence from a compromised device with that from a non-compromised device. Authenticity and integrity protection MUST be provided by the attestation technology. For additional security considerations related to Collections, refer to Section 8.2.¶

RATS conceptual messages are typically secured using cryptography. If the messages are already protected, no additional security requirements are imposed by this encapsulation. If an adversary attempts to modify the payload encapsulation, it will result in incorrect processing of the encapsulated message, leading to an error. If the messages are not protected, additional security must be added at a different layer. For example, a cbor-record containing an Unprotected CWT Claims Set (UCCS) [I-D.ietf-rats-uccs] can be signed as described in Section 4.1.¶

Section 4 describes a number of methods that can be used to add cryptographic protection to CMW.¶

8.2. Collection CMWs

If the Collection CMW is not protected from tampering by external security measures (such as object security primitives) or internal mechanisms (such as intra-item binding), an attacker could easily manipulate the Collection's contents. It is the responsibility of the Attester who creates the Collection CMW to ensure that the contents of the Collection are integrity-protected. The designer of the attestation technology is typically in charge of ensuring that the security properties are met, not the user of the conceptual message wrapper. In particular, when a CMW is used to carry multiple Evidence messages for a composite device or layered attestation, there should be strong binding between the Evidence messages within the Collection. This binding is needed to prevent attacks where Evidence from a subverted part of the device is replaced by Evidence from a separate non-subverted device. The binding of Evidence messages should be some form of attestation. For example, key material used to sign/bind an entire Collection CMW should be an attestation key, handled as described in Section 12.1 of [RFC9334]. The binding does not necessarily have to be a signature over the Collection CMW, it might also be achieved through identifiers, cross-linking, signing or hashing between the members of the Collection. Client-authenticated TLS may be used to bind a Collection CMW of Evidence messages. However, the client key used with TLS should not be that of the end-user or owner of the device. Instead, it should be attestation-oriented key material from the device or the attester manufacturer.¶

9.1. CWT cmw Claim Registration

IANA is requested to add a new cmw claim to the "CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims" registry [IANA.cwt] as follows:¶

• Claim Name: cmw¶

• Claim Description: A RATS Conceptual Message Wrapper¶

• JWT Claim Name: cmw¶

• Claim Key: CPA299¶

• Claim Value Type(s): CBOR map, CBOR array, or CBOR tag¶

• Change Controller: IETF¶

• Specification Document(s): Section 3.1, Section 3.3 and Section 3.2 of RFCthis¶

9.2. JWT cmw Claim Registration

IANA is requested to add a new cmw claim to the "JSON Web Token Claims" registry of the "JSON Web Token (JWT)" registry group [IANA.jwt] as follows:¶

• Claim Name: cmw¶

• Claim Description: A RATS Conceptual Message Wrapper¶

• Change Controller: IETF¶

• Specification Document(s): Section 3.1 and Section 3.3 of RFCthis¶

9.3. +jws Structured Syntax Suffix

IANA is requested to register the +jws structured syntax suffix in the "Structured Syntax Suffixes" registry [IANA.media-type-structured-suffix] in the manner described in [RFC6838], which can be used to indicate that the media type is encoded as JSON Web Signature (JWS) [RFC7515].¶

9.4. CBOR Tag Registration

IANA is requested to add the following tag to the "CBOR Tags" [IANA.cbor-tags] registry.¶

9.5. RATS Conceptual Message Wrapper (CMW) Indicators Registry

This specification defines a new "RATS Conceptual Message Wrapper (CMW) Indicators" registry, with the policy "Expert Review" (Section 4.5 of [BCP26]).¶

The objective is to have CMW Indicators values registered for all RATS Conceptual Messages (Section 8 of [RFC9334]).¶

This registry is to be added to the Remote Attestation Procedures (RATS) registry group at [IANA.rats].¶

9.6. Media Types

IANA is requested to add the following media types to the "Media Types" registry [IANA.media-types].¶

9.7. CoAP Content-Formats

IANA is requested to register the following Content-Format IDs in the "CoAP Content-Formats" registry, within the "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Parameters" registry group [IANA.core-parameters]:¶

If possible, TBD1 and TBD2 should be assigned in the 256..9999 range.¶

9.8. New SMI Numbers Registrations

IANA is requested to assign an object identifier (OID) for the CMW extension defined in Section 4.4 in the "SMI Security for PKIX Certificate Extension" registry of the "SMI Numbers" [IANA.smi-numbers] registry group:¶

IANA is requested to assign an object identifier (OID) for the ASN.1 Module defined in Section 4.4.1 in the "SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier" registry of the "SMI Numbers" [IANA.smi-numbers] registry group:¶

10.1. Normative References

[BCP26]

Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8126>.

[IANA.cbor-tags]

IANA, "Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) Tags", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/cbor-tags>.

[IANA.core-parameters]

IANA, "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Parameters", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/core-parameters>.

[IANA.cwt]

IANA, "CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/cwt>.

[IANA.jwt]

IANA, "JSON Web Token (JWT)", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt>.

[IANA.media-type-structured-suffix]

IANA, "Structured Syntax Suffixes", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/media-type-structured-suffix>.

[IANA.media-types]

IANA, "Media Types", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types>.

[IANA.rats]

IANA, "Remote Attestation Procedures (RATS)", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/rats>.

[IANA.smi-numbers]

IANA, "Structure of Management Information (SMI) Numbers (MIB Module Registrations)", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers>.

[RFC2119]

Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

[RFC3986]

Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3986>.

[RFC4648]

Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4648>.

[RFC5280]

Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280>.

[RFC6838]

Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13, RFC 6838, DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, January 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6838>.

[RFC7252]

Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252, DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7252>.

[RFC7515]

Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7515>.

[RFC7519]

Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7519>.

[RFC8174]

Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

[RFC8610]

Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and JSON Data Structures", RFC 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC8610, June 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8610>.

[RFC9165]

Bormann, C., "Additional Control Operators for the Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL)", RFC 9165, DOI 10.17487/RFC9165, December 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9165>.

[RFC9277]

Richardson, M. and C. Bormann, "On Stable Storage for Items in Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)", RFC 9277, DOI 10.17487/RFC9277, August 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9277>.

[STD90]

Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259, DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8259>.

[STD94]

Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949, DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, December 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8949>.

[X.680]

International Telephone and Telegraph Consultative Committee, "Specification of Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of Basic Notation", CCITT Recommendation X.680, July 1994.

10.2. Informative References

[DICE-arch]

Trusted Computing Group, "DICE Attestation Architecture", January 2024, <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/DICE-Attestation-Architecture-Version-1.1-Revision-18_pub.pdf>.

[I-D.bormann-cbor-draft-numbers]

Bormann, C., "Managing CBOR codepoints in Internet-Drafts", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-bormann-cbor-draft-numbers-04, 29 August 2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-bormann-cbor-draft-numbers-04>.

[I-D.fossati-tls-attestation]

Tschofenig, H., Sheffer, Y., Howard, P., Mihalcea, I., Deshpande, Y., Niemi, A., and T. Fossati, "Using Attestation in Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-fossati-tls-attestation-08, 21 October 2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-fossati-tls-attestation-08>.

[I-D.ietf-lamps-csr-attestation]

Ounsworth, M., Tschofenig, H., Birkholz, H., Wiseman, M., and N. Smith, "Use of Remote Attestation with Certification Signing Requests", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-csr-attestation-16, 1 February 2025, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lamps-csr-attestation-16>.

[I-D.ietf-rats-ar4si]

Voit, E., Birkholz, H., Hardjono, T., Fossati, T., and V. Scarlata, "Attestation Results for Secure Interactions", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-ar4si-08, 6 February 2025, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-rats-ar4si-08>.

[I-D.ietf-rats-corim]

Birkholz, H., Fossati, T., Deshpande, Y., Smith, N., and W. Pan, "Concise Reference Integrity Manifest", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-corim-06, 18 October 2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-rats-corim-06>.

[I-D.ietf-rats-eat]

Lundblade, L., Mandyam, G., O'Donoghue, J., and C. Wallace, "The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-eat-31, 6 September 2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-rats-eat-31>.

[I-D.ietf-rats-eat-media-type]

Lundblade, L., Birkholz, H., and T. Fossati, "EAT Media Types", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-eat-media-type-12, 3 November 2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-rats-eat-media-type-12>.

[I-D.ietf-rats-uccs]

Birkholz, H., O'Donoghue, J., Cam-Winget, N., and C. Bormann, "A CBOR Tag for Unprotected CWT Claims Sets", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-uccs-12, 3 November 2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-rats-uccs-12>.

[RFC5912]

Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912, DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5912>.

[RFC6268]

Schaad, J. and S. Turner, "Additional New ASN.1 Modules for the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and the Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 6268, DOI 10.17487/RFC6268, July 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6268>.

[RFC7942]

Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205, RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7942>.

[RFC9193]

Keränen, A. and C. Bormann, "Sensor Measurement Lists (SenML) Fields for Indicating Data Value Content-Format", RFC 9193, DOI 10.17487/RFC9193, June 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9193>.

[RFC9334]

Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and W. Pan, "Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) Architecture", RFC 9334, DOI 10.17487/RFC9334, January 2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9334>.

[STD96]

Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Structures and Process", STD 96, RFC 9052, DOI 10.17487/RFC9052, August 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9052>.